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INTRODUCTION
Patent law is based on a power conferred by the framers of the
Constitution for the Legislature "[t]o promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing.for limited Times to Authors and Inven-
tors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."'
Congress over time has developed the patent law to secure a monop-
oly to an inventor in exchange for her immediate disclosure to the
public and public dedication in seventeen years. Because of the mag-
nitude of the grant of a monopoly, strict rules exist that must be ad-
hered to in order to receive a patent.' These rules require a patent
applicant to describe in "full, clear, concise and exact terms"3 the pat-
ented invention. From this strict description it inherently follows that
it would be easy to copy or commit fraud4 on a patent by simply mak-
ing insignificant changes to the patented device. By making such a
change, the unscrupulous inventor's device would not fall within the
description of the patented invention, thus avoiding infringement of
the patent.5 This practice has been recognized for nearly 140 years.6
The Supreme Court recognized this "loophole" in patent laws,7
and developed what is known today as the Doctrine of Equivalents."
"[A] patentee may invoke this doctrine to proceed against [an alleged
infringer] 'if [the accused device] performs substantially the same
function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result' [as
the patented device]." 9 This is the "function/way/result" test.
1. U.S. CoNsr. art. L § 8.
2. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1992).
3. Id. § 112 (1992).
4. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Product Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
5. "[W]hoever without authority makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within the
United States during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent." 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
6. See Winans v. Dennead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853) (discussing for the first time
the principles of equivalency).
7. Id
8. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
9. Id at 608.
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While there has been criticism of the equivalents doctrine, 10 the
doctrine still applies today and does .not appear to be in danger of
abandonment.' The doctrine imposes some uncertainty into the pat-
ent law because neither the public nor the patent holder can be sure of
the exact limits of the patent.' 2 Further, there is no clear definition of
the doctrine; either for the patentee, the "infringer," attorneys, or the
jury. For example, in Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc. 3 the jury
verdict of infringement was overturned on a judgement not with-
standing the verdict (JNOV) motion because the jury was found to
have insufficient evidence to make a finding under the doctrine of
equivalents. Even though both parties agreed the jury instruction was
adequate and correct, the verdict was overturned, resulting in the loss
for the patent holder, Mal of a $900,000 verdict. 4 One federal dis-
trict court judge has noted that the Federal Circuit should issue stan-
dard jury instructions in patent cases.' 5
This comment will discuss the applicability and development of a
standard jury instruction for the federal district courts when the ques-
tion of fact to be decided by the jury is whether an accused device
infringes a patent under the doctrine of equivalents. The Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) has jurisdiction over all patent
cases' 6 from the district courts, and a standard jury instruction would
minimize the confusion and conflicts in the area of patent law regard-
ing the extent and requirements of the doctrine of equivalents. Part I
10. See Martin Adelman, The New World of Patents Created by the Court of Appeal for
the Federal Circuit, 20 U. MICH. J.L. Rm. 979 (1987); Martin J Adelman & Gary L. Francione,
The Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Law: Questions that Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U.
PA. L.R. 673 (1989).
11. Accord London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Pennwalt
Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (Bennett, J., dissent) (in
bane), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988).
12. See, e.g., Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 939 (Nies, J., additional views); Adelman,.supra note
10, at 995-96.
13. 952 F.2d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
14. See Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc., 952 F.2d 1320, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
15. Pat. Trademark & Copyright J.(BNA), June 15, 1992. (Judge Avern Cohn of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan). This district court heard Lear Seigler, Inc. v.
Sealy Mattress Co. of Michigan, Civil Action No. 84-CV-75319-DT (August 21, 1987), and
awarded the plaintiff $2.8 million based on a doctrine of equivalents infringement action. The
case was reversed, 873 F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1989), because there was insufficient evidence
presented to find infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.
16. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created by the Federal Courts Im-
provement Act of 1982, PuB. L. No. 97-164, § 126, 96 Stat. 25, 37 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1295 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). This court replaced the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals and was created in an effort to alleviate the docket of the Supreme Court as well as
provide enhancement of the patent system. The court has exclusive jurisdiction of all patent
appeals, and the Supreme Court rarely, if ever, hears patent cases anymore. See Adelman, supra
note 10.
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of this comment will analyze the history of the doctrine and the pres-
ent state of the law regarding the doctrine and the elements it encom-
passes. Part II will focus on the issues to be considered by the jury,
including the main point of contention in the doctrine of equivalents
jurisprudence, whether the court or the jury should use an "element-
by-element" or an "as a whole" approach, 17 and the distinction be-
tween those issues to be considered by the court and those considered
by the jury when reaching a verdict on infringement under the doctrine
of equivalence. Part III will discuss the requirements of a jury instruc-
tion. and propose a standard jury instruction for use by the federal dis-
trict courts when the doctrine of equivalents is invoked.
A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE PATENT LAW SYSTEM
Patent law is authorized by the United States Constitution and
was most recently codified in 1953.18 A patent is a limited grant by
the United States government giving the patent owner the right to ex-
clude others from making, using or selling the patented product or
process in the United States for a limited period, generally 17 years.19
A patentee must apply for a patent with the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) by submitting an application."0 This appli-
cation generally consists of a written specification, which describes
the invention in such specific and clear terms so as to enable one
skilled in the art21 to make and use the patented invention.22 The
specifications "shall conclude with one or more claims particularly
pointing out and distinctly claiming" the patented device.23 The
claims define the invention. The claims "fix the scope of protection
to which the patentee is entitled" and also "tell the public what it can-
17. See infra part I.A. and part lH.D.
18. See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376.
19. Id. § 154.
20. Id. § 111.
21. One skilled in the art is someone who has general knowledge of the field that the
invention is connected with or developed for. This person could be an expert in the certain field
or they could be a mechanic who is thoroughly familiar with a certain machine or process.
22. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
23. Id. § 112.
24. See Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 949 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(Nies, J., additional views) (en banc), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988),
The purpose of a claim has not changed since it was stated in White v. Dunbar,
119 U.S. 47, 52 (citations omitted) (1886), as follows: The claim is a statutory
requirement, prescribed for the very purpose of making the patentee define pre-
cisely what his invention is; and it is unjust to the public, as well as an evasion of
the law, to construe it in a manner different from the plain import of its terms.
Id.; see also Smith v. Snow, 294 U.S. 1 (1935).
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not make, use or sell."5 In determining whether a patent has been
infringed, only the claims, not the specification or drawings, are used
by the courts.26 The specification and drawings can be used to inter-
pret, clarify and narrow, but not broaden, a claim. However, the claim
sentence itself is what the patentee legally can exclude others from
making, using, or selling.' A claim consists of elements of the inven-
tion and defines the metes and bounds, or extent, of the invention. 2
The elements can be thought of as limitations on what the patentee has
claimed; in other words, every new element written into a claim
means the patentee has claimed less subject matter than without the
element. Conversely, if the patentee included fewer elements, or limi-
tations, she would claim more subject matter.
Infringement occurs when one makes, uses, or sells the patented
device without the permission of the inventor.29 There are two types
of infringement: 1) literal infringement30 and 2) infringement under
the doctrine of equivalents. The court first determines whether there
has been literal infringement in an infringement lawsuit. Literal in-
fringement is when the elements of the accused device "read on," or
are exactly the same as, the claimed elements of the patent. If there is
no finding of literal infringement, or no attempt to prove literal in-
fringement, infringement may still be alleged by using the doctrine of
equivalents.3 '
PART I: T Docrnm OF EQuIvALENTs
While the idea of equivalency was first noted in 1853,32 the
Supreme Court first clarified the doctrine of equivalents in 1950 in
25. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 949.
26. See, e.g., Aro Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., Inc., 365 U.S. 336,
339 (1961); Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
27. SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (in
bane) ("claims are infringed, not specifications").
28. The elements of a claim are the individual pieces of the claim. In other words, assume
an invention was a pencil. The elements of this claim might then consist of (A) a straight piece
of graphite, (B) a wooden protective sleeve bonded to the outside of the graphite, and (C) the
metal eraser end attached to the wooden sleeve at an end. The elements of the claim would be A,
B, and C. (This example is not a correct claim description but is intended only for clarification.).
29. See 35 U.S.C. § 271.
30. SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en
banc) (finding literal infringement when the accused invention "reads directly, unequivocally,
and word-for-word on [the patented] structure"). Literal infringement is when the elements of
the accused device "read on" the elements of the patent.
31. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("[t]he
doctrine of equivalents comes into play only when actual literal infringement is not found").
32. See Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853).
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Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co.33 This
decision established the function/way/result test for equivalency 34 and
held "[t]he essence of the doctrine is that one may not practice a fraud
on a patent."35 If the doctrine were not allowed, the patent would be a
"hollow and useless thing"36 because the patent scope could be easily
evaded through a trivial modification. The Court noted that the doc-
trine should only be applied to insubstantial and unimportant changes
and substitutions from the claimed device.37 Were it not for the doc-
trine of equivalents, these changes, though adding nothing to the ad-
vancement of the sciences, "would be enough to take the copied
matter outside the claim, and hence outside the reach of the law."'38
A.- A Major Source of Confusion in the Doctrine of
Equivalents Determination: the "Element-by-Element"
vs. "As a Whole" Analysis
Two methods for proving infringement have evolved under a
doctrine of equivalents analysis: the "element-by-element" and the "as
a whole" methods. The early cases are unclear regarding which
method to use. In 1983, the CAFC, in Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United
States,39 gave one of its first descriptions of the application of the
doctrine. Previously, a patent had been granted on a satellite that was
capable of receiving and directly executing control signals from a
ground control station on Earth. The accused device used new
microprocessor techniques that did not respond directly to signals
from Earth, but executed control operations only after processing cer-
tain signals received from Earth. In other words, some control func-
tions were actually performed on board the satellite, instead of the
satellite simply receiving and executing control signals from Earth.
The court found infringement under the doctrine of equivalents,
by applying the doctrine to the device "as a whole."'40 To apply the
33. 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
34. If an accused device "performs substantially the same function in substantially the
same way to obtain the same result" it- will be found to be infringing under the doctrine of
equivalents. Id. at 608. In the same case, five lines later, the Court uses the phrase "substantially
the same result" when describing the test. For purposes of this comment, this distinction will not
be addressed and has not been an issue for the CAFC in its doctrine of equivalents jurisprudence.
For a discussion of this issue see Questions, supra note 10, at 680.
35. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608.
36. Id. at 607.
37. Id
38. Id.
39. 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (reversing the district court's finding of infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents).
40. Id. at 1364-66.
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doctrine to the device "as a whole" meant to ask whether the accused
device performs a substantially similar function in a substantially simi-
lar way to achieve substantially the same result as the claimed inven-
tion. The appeals court reasoned that the district court's doctrine of
equivalents test, where the court looked for "obvious and exact"
equivalents of the elements of a claim, was no more than a redundant
literal infringement inquiry.4 1
This "as a whole" approach to the doctrine of equivalents became
a clouded issue in the subsequent cases heard by the CAFC. In Martin
v. Barber"2 and Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal, Ltd.,43 both decided in
1985, the court used the "as a whole" approach when considering in-
fringement under the doctrine of equivalents. Later, in 1986, in a
highly criticized case,44 Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States Inter-
national Trade Commission,4 the court seemed to use the "as a
whole" language when finding no infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents."
In contrast, in a 1984 decision, ACS Hospital Systems, Inc. v.
Montefiore Hospital,47 the CAFC found no infringement because the
accused device did not have one element of the claimed device, an
override function for a locked key switch.48 Again, in 1985, in Lemel-
son v. United States,49 the court used an "element-by-element" ap-
proach when affirming a finding of non-infringement by the district
court.5 0 In this type of equivalents' approach, known as the "all ele-
ments" rule, each element of a claimed device, or its equivalent, must
appear in the accused device to find infringement."' Further, each cor-
responding element in the accused device, as opposed to the entire
41. Md at 1364.
42. 755 F.2d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
43. 781 F.2d 861 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
44. See Emily Lau, The Test for Patent Infringement Under the Doctrine of Equivalents
after Pennwalt v. Durand-Wayland, 22 IND. L. REv. 849, 865 (1989).
45. 805 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1986). reh'g denied 846 F.2d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
46. Id. at 1570. One author has noted, "[t]he Court does not relieve the tension between
the discussion of the 'invention as a whole' as part of the literal infringement analysis and the
reference to the same test in its discussion of the doctrine of equivalence." Barry E.
Bretschneider, The Doctrine of Equivalents After Pennwalt and Texas Instruments, in PRoCEED-
Nas OF THE TwENTY-Sncris ANNuAL INsTrrtum ON PATENT LAW 3-1, 3-9 (Carol J. HoIgren ed.,
1989).
47. 732 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
48. Id.
49. 752 F.2d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
50. "It is also well settled that each element of a claim is material and essential, and that in
order for a court to find infringement, the plaintiff must show the presence of every element or
its substantial equivalent in the accused device." Id. at 1551.
51. Lemelson, 752 F.2d at 1551. See also Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 949 (Nies, J., additional
views).
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device, must perform substantially the same function in substantially
the same way to achieve substantially the same result as each element
in the claimed invention for there to be a finding of infringement. 52
Note the distinction between the two approaches. Under the ele-
ment-by-element approach, each and every element, or its equivalent,
in the claimed device must be present in the accused device, and then
each and every element in the accused device must be shown to per-
form substantially the same result in substantially the same way to
achieve substantially the same result as each element in the claimed
device. Conversely, under the "as a whole" approach, the test is ap-
plied to the devices from an overall perspective: whether the accused
device performs substantially the same result in substantially the same
way to achieve substantially the same result as the claimed device.
In 1987, in Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc.,53 the
CAFC approved the use of the element-by-element approach for the
doctrine of equivalents inquiry.5" Pennwalt involved a patent for a
fruit sorting device. The claimed machine consisted of a conveyor
belt that moved fruit over a scale and an optical scanner to determine
the weight and color of a piece of fruit and deliver it to the appropriate
place.55 During the prosecution56 of the patent, the applicant, in order
to avoid the prior art" and make the device patentable, added an ele-
ment to a claim requiring "some means for58 'continuously indicating
the position of an item to be sorted' " along the conveyor belt of the
52. See infra text accompanying notes 53-76.
53. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d 931.
54. The majority states, "It is clear that the district court correctly relied on an element-by-
element comparison to conclude there was no infringement under the doctrine of equivalents...
." Id. at 935. The dissent concurs with this holding of the element-by-element approach, but
argues that the majority "failed to consider the doctrine of equivalents issue in accordance with
the precedents of both this court and the Supreme Court." Id. at 939 (Bennett, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 935.
56. The process of applying for a patent and moving the application through the PTO is
referred to as patent prosecution.
57. The prior art is what is known in the field the patent encompasses prior to the disclo-
sure of the patent. See infra text accompanying notes 91-95.
58. "An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for
performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material , or acts in support
thereof... "' 35 U.S.C. § 112. See discussion infra part lI.E. What this type of claim does is
allow the patentee to describe a certain means for a specified function, thereby not limiting her
claim to a specific element, but only a means of accomplishing, something.
An example would be helpful. Returning to the pencil described earlier, it was described as
having an eraser on an end of the wooden shaft. Generally, the specific requirement of a claim
would require a description of the material of the eraser. With a "means for" analysis, the claim
could read, "means for removal of the graphite when applied to a surface being connected to end
of wooden shaft," for example. This would not limit the patent to a specific eraser material, thus
providing a broader patent covering more embodiments of the device.
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device. 9 The accused device did not have any element which could
perform this function.'
The analysis of this case was complex as the court tried to iden-
tify exactly how the doctrine of equivalents applied. The entire court
agreed that there was no literal infringement,61 but sharply disagreed
on infringement under the equivalents doctrine. The 7-4 majority ap-
proved the element-by-element approach,62 whereas the dissent ar-
gued this was a sub silentio overruling of precedent.63 Judge Nies,
who voted with the majority, wrote "additional views" discussing the
precedent regarding infringement analysis as applied to limitations in
a claimf Judge Newman, who voted with the dissent, wrote a sepa-
rate opinion entitled "commentary" in which she extensively de-
scribed judicial precedent with respect to the doctrine of equivalents.65
The majority found no infringement under the doctrine because "cer-
tain functions of the claimed invention were 'missing' from the ac-
cused device."6 6 The court held that the addition of the position
indicating means to the claim was a limitation on that to which the
patentee legally had the rights,67 and "[a] device which does not sat-
isfy this limitation at least equivalently does not function in substan-
tially the same way as the claimed invention. '68 The dissent sharply
disagreed with a pure element-by-element analysis and argued that the
two devices should be viewed as a whole. The inquiry would there-
fore be "by viewing the device as a whole whether it and the claimed
invention operate in substantially the same way and have substantially
the same function and result as the claimed invention." 69 Pennwalt
represents the last case in which the CAFC directly addressed the two
approaches7' and as a result has generated much comment.7 1
59. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 938.
60. Id. at 937.
61. Id. at 934, 939.
62. Id. at 935.
63. Id. at 939 (Bennett, J., dissent).
64. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 949.
65. Id. at 954.
66. Id. at 935.
67. More correctly, this is said what the "patentee legally had the right to exclude others
from making, using, or selling." See 35 U.S.C. § 271.
68. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 937.
69. Id. at 940. Judge Bennett, dissenting, emphasized: "the purported 'element-by-element
comparison' was never the extent of the doctrine of equivalents analysis under our here-ignored
precedents which also required that the analysis be undertaken in light of the entirety of the
accused device and the entirety of the [patented device]." Id. (emphasis added). The opinion
does not address the case where infringement is found under the "as a whole" approach, but not
under the "element-by-elemene' approach, a very likely situation.
70. In Malta v. Schmulerich Carillons, Inc., 952 F.2d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 1991), the court still
made no clear statement. The dissent states, "[t]he panel majority finds an inadequate showing
1994]
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The CAFC has identified other corollary issues relevant to this
continuing conflict between approaches to be considered under a doc-
trine of equivalents analysis. The court stated in Pennwalt that, while
there must be in the accused structure the equivalent of every claim
limitation, these equivalents do not necessarily have to be a corre-
sponding component.72 The CAFC has recognized "[o]ne-to-one cor-
respondence of components is not required, and elements or steps may
be combined without ipso facto loss of equivalency."73
But the CAFC has made it clear that all limitations of a claim, or
an equivalent of the limitations, must be present in the accused device
for there to be infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. The
CAFC in Lemelson v. United States,74 stated that each element is "ma-
terial and es'ential," and in 1990 in- Becton Dickinson & Co. v. C.R.
Bard, Inc.,75 the court reiterated that "whether necessary or not, after
issuance, all limitations in a claim are material and must be met ex-
actly or equivalently in an accused device to find that the accused
device works in the same way."76
The CAFC has oscillated on another issue that stems from con-
siderations of limitations of a claim, that of whether the "heart" or
"gist" of the invention is a factor to consider when determining if a
limitation exists in the accused device. The CAFC, in 1984, prior to
the acceptance of the element-by-element approach in Atlas Powder
Co. v. E.L Du Pont De Nemours & Co.,7 7 indicated that there is a
"heart" of an invention that can be considered. The court stated,
"[a]lthough there is no legally recognized 'essence' or 'heart' of the
of why the elements work in the same way", implying that an element-by-element approach was
taken by the majority. Id. at 1339 (Newman, J., dissent). But see discussion infra part I.E. See
also Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd., 868 F.2d 1226, 1238 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding a jury
interrogatory prejudicial because it "isolated [one] specific claim element so that it was removed
from the perspective that is obtained only when the claimed invention is viewed in its entirety.").
71. See Lau, supra note 44; Adelman, supra note 10; Adelman & Francione, supra note
10; 4 DONALD S. CHnsum, PATENTs § 18.0411] (1990).
72. Coming Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., 868 F.2d 1251 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
73. Sun Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equip. Leasing, Inc., 872 F.2d 978, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1989),
modified, 872 F.2d 978 (Fed. Cir. 1989). See also Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd., 868
F.2d 1226, 1238 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding a jury interrogatory prejudicial because it "isolated
[one] specific claim element so that it was removed from the perspective that is obtained only
when the claimed invention is viewed in its entirety.").
74. 752 F.2d 1538, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
75. 922 F.2d 792, 798 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
76. Becton Dickinson, 922 F.2d at 798. See also Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc., 939 F.2d
1533, 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ('To work 'in substantially the same way,' all the limitations of the
claim must be satisfied at least equivalently."); Key Mfg. Group, Inc. v. Microdot, Inc., 925 F.2d
1444, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ('To support an infringement determination, an accused device must
embody exactly each claim limitation or its equivalent.").
77. 750 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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invention in determining validity, ... it can be applicable in a determi-
nation of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents." ' However,
in 1987, in a footnote in Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse,79 the
CAFC called these references to the "heart" or "gist" of the invention
"dicta," and said that these cases80 should not imply that claim limita-
tions can be ignored as insignificant or immaterial in determining in-
fringement."1 In other words, even if a certain claim limitation were
not the heart, or the most important part of the invention, it still must
be met in order to find equivalence. This seems to imply an element-
by-element approach. The court said these "dicta" indicated only
what Graver Tank set forth, that one should not be able to appropriate
an invention through an insubstantial change that does not substan-
tially change the function performed by the claimed device. Judge
Newman took issue with what she termed the court's changing of pre-
cedent without so saying. In her dissent she argued that "this impor-
tant issue should be confronted directly, as a matter of public policy,"
and she continued by stating that failure to reach a consistent applica-
tion of precedent will be destructive to the purposes of the patent
system.8 2
The CAFC emphasis that insubstantial changes should not be al-
lowed to defeat an infringement challenge suggests an element-by-
element approach. The element-by-element analysis will allow small
changes, which may be important to a deliberating jury. This ap-
proach requires consideration of each and every element in a claim,
whereas the "as a whole" approach may allow certain changes, minor,
although not insubstantial, to be completely overlooked. 3
At present, Pennwalt has not been overruled. Accordingly, the
element-by-element approach seems the proper approach, and cannot
be said to be a basis for reversal.84 This comment will argue for the
78. Id. at 1582.
79. 822 F.2d 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
80. The case cited Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861 (Fed. Cir. 1985) and Atlas
Powder Co. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1984), both of these
cited Medtronic, Inc. v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., 721 F.2d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
81. See Perkin-Elmer, 822 F.2d at 1531 n.6.
82. Id. at 1535. See also Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd., 868 F.2d 1226, 1240 (Fed.
Cir. 1989) ("[T]here is no error in considering 'the principle of the claimed invention.' ').
83. See infra part II.D.
84. Cf. London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("plain-
tiff must show the presence of every element or its substantial equivalent in the accused device.")
(quoting Lemelson v. United States, 752 F.2d 1538, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1985)); Lear Seigler, Inc. v.
Sealy Mattress Co. of Mich., 873 F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (indicating that without explicit
testimony to the jury on the three Grdver Tank elements there is a risk that the jury will simply
compare the claimed and accused device as to overall similarity).
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element-by-element approach85 and will propose a jury instruction to
that end. But there is still considerable uncertainty on which approach
to use. One author, in view of modem rulings of the CAFC, has stated
that the "as a whole" test for equivalents "apparently still lives. 86
Another author proposes the doctrine of equivalents inquiry involves
both the element-by-element and the "as a whole" approach. 7 This
theory suggests that a court should look to each element in the claimed
and accused device, and then to the device as a whole when determin-
ing the range of equivalents for each element.88 In Pennwalt, Judge
Nies asserts, "[a]n infringement standard as vague as application of
the 'invention as a whole,' which permits claim limitations to be read
out of the claim, would nullify statutory requirements and violate due
process."8 9 While Judge Bennett, for the dissent in the same case,
claims that an element-by-element approach is "little more than a re-
dundant literal infringement inquiry."'  Nonetheless, an element-by-
element analysis is the best approach to follow, in that it is consistent
with Pennwalt.
B. Determination of the Range of Equivalents for the
Doctrine of Equivalents
The range given to the equivalents of a claim must be determined
before an analysis under the doctrine of equivalents can be performed.
The word "equivalents" implies a range, or scope, of possibilities.
The CAFC has addressed the determination of the range without many
conflicts in its decisions. As such, this part of the law concerning the
doctrine is well established. Still, these factors are relevant for a jury
instruction, and accordingly are presented herein and include the prior
art, prosecution history estoppel, and the distinction between a pioneer
verses a non-pioneer patent.
85. See infra part l.D.
86. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope,
90 CoLum. L. REv. 839, 059 (May 1990). Cf. Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd., 868 F.2d
1226 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (implying that it was prejudicial to isolate one claim element from the
others in a jury interrogatory because the perspective obtained by viewing the invention in its
entirety is lost.).
87. Lau, supra note 44.
88. Id. at 862.
89. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 954 (Nies, J., additional views). The statutory requirements
refers to 35 U.S.C. § 112, which requires the invention to be described in full, clear and concise
language. The due process violation is a lack of notice to the public and competitors as to what
the patent encompasses.
90. Id. at 940 (Bennett, L, dissenting).
[Vol. 10
PROPOSED STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTION
1. Prior Art
The prior art is the existing state of public knowledge in a partic-
ular art at the time the invention is made. It includes all publications,
issued patents, and all other knowledge deemed to be publicly avail-
able.9 To receive a patent, the invention, i.e., the promotion or ad-
vancement of the sciences,92 must be non-obvious to one skilled in the
art.93 The Supreme Court has defined the non-obviousness of an in-
vention with respect to the prior art: "Under [35 U.S.C.] § 103, the
scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; differences
between the prior art and the [patented claims] are to be ascertained"
and if this difference would not be obvious to a person having ordi-
nary skill in the art, the claim is said to be non-obvious, 94 thereby
satisfying one of the three requirements for patentability. 95 Re-
phrased, to be considered patentable subject matter, the invention must
go beyond the prior art, and must advance the sciences in a non-obvi-
ous way.
When determining the range of equivalents given to a claim be-
ing interpreted under the doctrine of equivalents, the range cannot be
extended to encompass the prior art." If the range included the prior
art, the patentee could claim more than the patent disclosed. This pro-
duces unfairness to those trying to design around, or improve upon,
the patent, or anyone relying on the patent. In Wilson Sporting Goods
Co. v. David Geoffrey & Associates,97 the CAFC established an ap-
proach to prior art limitations to assist the court and the jury in deter-
mining the extent to which the prior art limited the scope of the
claims. In Wilson, Judge Rich stated:
To simplify analysis and bring the issue [of extent of claims with
respect to the prior art] onto familiar turf, it may be helpful to con-
ceptualize the limitation on the scope of equivalents by visualizing
a hypothetical patent claim, sufficient in scope to literally cover the
accused product. The pertinent question then becomes whether the
hypothetical claim could have been allowed by the PTO over the
prior art. If not, then it would be improper to permit the patentee to
91. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)&(b).
92. See supra text accompanying note 1.
93. 35 U.S.C. § 103.
94. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966).
95. The other two requirements are that the invention be useful and that it be novel. See 35
U.S.C. § 101.
96. E.g., Stewart-Warner Corp. v. City of Pontiac, Mich., 767 F.2d 1563, 1572 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
97. 904 F.2d 677 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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obtain that coverage in an infringement suit under the doctrine of
equivalents.98
Judge Rich suggested that to assist the court, and jury, in under-
standing the extent of the range of the prior art, a hypothetical claim,
for the patented device, should be created. To comply with the
Judge's suggestion, this claim should be written to make the accused
device clearly and literally infringe. This claim should be suggested
by counsel. This claim would then be viewed from the perspective of
a patent examiner, at the time the patent was applied for, to decide if
the claim would have been allowed to be patented, because it would
not encompass the prior art. The burden of proof would be on the
patentee to prove the range it seeks to encompass through the doctrine
of equivalents would not cover the prior art.99
Wilson dealt with the dimple arrangement on the surface of a golf
ball, with the inventor's intention to create a more symmetrical distri-
bution of dimples. The claims as written were complicated, 1' ° as were
the mathematical analysis performed by the court 1 ' when applying
the new test. The CAFC reversed the lower court's infringement
judgment, finding that, by using the hypothetical claim approach, the
district court had improperly extended the scope of the claims. The
CAFC has embraced this approach by using it again in Key Manufac-
turing Group, Inc. v. Microdot, Inc.'02 suggesting its embrace by the
CAFC.
2. Prosecution History Estoppel
In addition to the prior art, prosecution history estoppel also
serves as a limitation when determining the range of equivalents.
98. Id. at 684.
99. Id. at 685.
100. Claim 1 stated:
A golf ball having a spherical surface with a plurality of dimples formed therein
and six great circle paths which do not intersect any di[m]ples, the dimples being
arranged by dividing the spheroical [sic] surfaces into twenty spherical triangles
corresponding to the faces of a regular icosaedron, each of the twenty triangles
being sub-divided into four smaller triangles consisting of a central triangle and
three apical triangles by connecting the midpoints [of the sides] of each of said
twenty triangles along great circle paths, said dimples being arranged so that the
dimples do not intersect the sides of any of the central triangles.
4 D. CHmsUM, supra note 71, § 18.0412] (quoting the language of Wilson Sporting Goods Co.,
904 F.2d 677).
101. See 4 D. Cnsum, supra note 71, § 18.04[2].
102. 925 F.2d 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1991). See also Insta-Foam Products, Inc. v. Universal Foam
Systems, Inc., 906 F.2d 698 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("the hypothetical claim drawn to encompass [the
accused infringer's product] would not have been unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 in view of
the [pertinent prior art] patent.").
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When the patentee submits her application to the Patent and Trade-
mark Office (PTO), it is checked to make sure it is all in order and
inserted into a folder, or "file wrapper ' 10 3 which is given to the exam-
iner to review. All correspondence between the patentee and PTO are
put into the file wrapper, and the entire package is known as the prose-
cution history."° During the prosecution of the patent, the patentee
may be required to amend or narrow the claims as submitted in order
to avoid the prior art. By narrowing the claims during the application
process in order to receive the patent, the patentee will generally be
considered to have a placed a limitation on their claim in the patent.105
Prosecution history estoppel then prevents the patentee from recover-
ing, through the use of the doctrine of equivalents, what she has given
up during prosecution in order to acquire the patent.' 0 6 In other
words, as one federal circuit has explained, it is a defense used by the
accused infringer and "only applies where infringement is shown
under the doctrine of equivalents." 0 7
Prosecution history estoppel only applies to doctrine of
equivalents infringement, not literal infringement.' 08 In Loctite Corp.
v. Ultraseal Ltd.,' 09 the court discussed-two ways the prosecution his-
tory is used for a determination of infringement. First, it may be used
to "interpret the language of the claims of a patent" when.the court is
considering literal infringement." 0 This is not using the prosecution
history for estoppel, but using it to clarify and interpret. Secondly, it
is used as an estoppel to limit the doctrine of equivalents. The court
stated, "[a]pplication of prosecution history estoppel... should be
performed as a legal matter on a case-by-case basis.""'
103. This "file wrapper" is literally a three flapped folder, where one flap folds over the
middle one and then the opposite flap folds over it to form a wrapper around the file. Prosecu-
tion history estoppel used to be referred to as file wrapper estoppel until the CAFC changed the
terminology.
104. See supra note 56.
105. See Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 934 (patentee's addition of "position indicating means" in a
claim in order to avoid the prior art was considered a limitation on the claim, resulting in a
finding of no infringement when the accused device did not have this limitation.).
106. See Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126, 136 (1942); Dixie USA,
Inc. v. Infab Corp., 927 F.2d 584, 588 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
107. Olympic Fastening Sys., Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 504 F.2d 609, 615 (6th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 1004 (1975).
108. See Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. United States Steel Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1278 (D. Del. 1987), aff'd, 865 F.2d
1247 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
109; 781 F.2d 861 (Fed. Cir. 1985). "
110. Id. at 870.
111. Id. at 871.
1994]
COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
A 1989 CAFC case, Senmed, Inc. v. Richard-Allan Medical In-
dustries,112 illustrates the effect of this estoppel. The patentee
changed the words in a claim from "toward" to "on" when describing
the position of staples on a medical stapler to the patent examiner in
order to distinguish his proposed improvement from the prior art and
receive a patent. The prior art indicated that certain staples were
moved to a point "above" (as opposed to "on") another point. The
patent examiner and the patentee agreed that the words "toward" and
"above" had the same meaning for this device, but "on" meant some-
thing different from "above." Changing the word "toward" to the
word "on," which altered the meaning of the claim, avoided the prior
art to allow patentability. At trial, the patentee indicated that "on"
meant "between the upper surface... and the lower [surface]," a defi-
nition accepted by the district court." 3 The CAFC, however, in grant-
ing a JNOV of the verdict of infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents, stated, "Th[e district court's] claim interpretation, how-
ever, is incontestably inconsistent with the position taken by [the pat-
entee] during prosecution of his patent application... [thus the] claim
interpretation cannot stand."' "4 The court's decision implies that since
the patentee changed the word "toward" to "on" to avoid the prior art,
which referred to "above," the patentee could not argue that "on"
means "between" in order to establish infringement of his patent.
3. Pioneer vs. Non-Pioneer Patent
The third factor for determining the range of equivalents is
whether the patent is a pioneer patent. The Supreme Court has long
recognized "the range of equivalents depends upon and varies with the
degree of invention,""' and a patent of an entirely new device, i.e., a
pioneer patent, will cover a greater range of equivalents than that of a
device that only improves upon an existing device, i.e., an improve-
ment or non-pioneer patent. A pioneer patent has been defined as a
patent having "the position occupied by the invention in the art to
which it pertains, or which it creates . . . ."I" An inventor has a
pioneer patent when the invention is "a function never before per-
formed, a wholly novel device, or one of such novelty and importance
as to mark a distinct step in the progress of the art .... ,117 An
112. 888 F.2d 815 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
113. Id. at 820 (emphasis added).
114. Id. at 820.
115. Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908).
116. MAC Corp. of Am. v. Williams Patent Crusher & Pulverizer Co., 767 F.2d 882, 884
n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
117. Boyden Power-Brake Co. v. Westinghouse, 170 U.S. 537, 569 (1898).
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example of this type of patent is the handheld calculator, the first of its
kind, in Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States International Trade
Commission.""
Conversely, an improvement patent is a patent for an improve-
ment in a previously patented device. This common type of patent is
similar to the patents-in-suit found in Pennwalt,1I 9 Lear Seigler Inc. v.
Sealy Mattress Co. of Michigan,20 and Malta v. Schulmerich Caril-
lons, Inc. 2 ' This patent is only a minor advancement in the progress
of the sciences, or is only a minor change in a field that is already
filled with various patents.
A pioneer patent is given a broad range of equivalents, whereas
an improvement patent is, inherently, given a narrow range of
equivalents. The CAFC has stated "[i]t has long been recognized that
the range of permissible equivalents depends upon the extent and na-
ture of the invention, and may be more generously interpreted for a
basic invention than for a less dramatical technological advance."'122
One lower court opined that the reason for a broad range of
equivalents for a pioneer patent is because of the difficulty of drafting
claims for a patent in an entirely new field.' 23 Thus, to allow a broad
range of equivalents is an equitable way to protect and encourage the
inventor with a pioneer invention, without which other improvement
patents may well not have been possible.' 24
This comment's proposed jury instruction reflects the require-
ments of these three limitations, the prior art, prosecution history
estoppel, and pioneer vs. improvement patent, on the range of
equivalents.
C. Post Patent Technology
The jury must consider whether technology that is developed af-
ter the issuance of a patent, of which the inventor could not have been
aware, can still infringe a patent under the doctrine of equivalents.
Although earlier courts had held that the doctrine of equivalents was
118. 805 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1986), reh'g denied, 846 F.2d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
119. See supra text accompanying notes 53-60.
120. 873 F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (patent on mattress box spring "springs").
121. 952 F.2d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (patent on method for changing the tone of musical
hand chimes while playing them).
122. Texas Instruments, Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 805 F.2d 1558, 1563 (Fed. Cir.
1986), reh'g denied, 846 F.2d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1988). See also Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead
Indus., Inc., 932 F.2d 1453, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ('The claimed invention is a mechanical
combination in a crowded field .... Such an invention is entitled only to a narrow range of
equivalents.").
123. Moore v. United States, 211 U.S.P.Q. 800 (Ct. Ci. Trial Div. 1981).
124. Id.
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not applicable to technology discovered after the patent was issued,125
the CAFC has made it clear that technology developed after the patent
issues can still infringe the patent through the doctrine of equivalents.
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States126 gave the CAFC one of its first
opportunities to address the issue in 1983. The patent owned by
Hughes was a means of controlling a satellite through a means for
receiving and executing control signals from the ground. 27 After the
issuance of the patent, improvements in microprocessor technology
made it possible for certain functions to be performed by the
microprocessor on the satellite rather than on the ground. The court
found infringement because the inventor is not required to predict all
future developments that will enable the practice of the invention. 128
The court affirmed this ruling in Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS,
Inc. 12
9
D. Evidentiary Requirements For a Jury Trial
In 1984, the CAFC first addressed some specific evidentiary re-
quirements for a jury to consider for infringement under the doctrine
of equivalents. In Nestier Corp. v Menasha Corp., Lewisystem Divi-
sion,' Nestier obtained a patent for stackable tote boxes, in which
the lids of the boxes were indented to receive a similar box. The lids
also had "interfitting raised and depressed areas" to "enhance secur-
ity" and provide strength for stacking. 3' At the close of trial, both
parties submitted jury instructions that did not include instructions on
the doctrine of equivalents. No infringement was found by the jury
under a literal infringement inquiry. On appeal, Nestier, the patent
holder, argued reversible error since the court did not instruct the jury
on the doctrine of equivalents infringement.1 32
The CAFC upheld the decision of the jury. In doing so, the court
held that, in order to establish infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents, the patentee must provide "evidence and argument con-
cerning the doctrine and each of its elements" of function, way and
result. 3 3 The court further clarified that equivalence must be estab-
125. See 4 D. CHsuM, supra note 71, § 18.04[3].
126. 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
127. See discussion supra part LA.
128. Hughes Aircraft, 717 F.2d at 1364-1365.
129. 872 F.2d 407, 409 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("Although a 'partial variation in technique,' an
embellishment made possible by post-[patent] technology, does not allow the accused device to
escape the 'web of infringement' ... ").
130. 739 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
131. Id. at 1578.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1579.
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lished "with respect to the claims of the patent," not "for the commer-
cial structures involved."'134 The court noted that a jury must be
explicitly told that a doctrine of equivalence analysis is to be used and
that the party will be presenting evidence showing equivalence of the
function, way and result.' 31 In Nestier, the appellate court reasoned
that the jury was not told that the doctrine of equivalents could serve
as a basis for a finding of infringement.
In 1989, the CAFC again addressed the evidentiary requirements
for doctrine of equivalents finding of infringement in Lear Seigler,
Inc. v. Sealy Mattress Co. of Michigan.36 Both parties were manufac-
turers of mattress box springs. Lear Seigler's (LSI) patent-in-suit in-
volved a certain style of spring. The jury found infringement under
the doctrine of equivalents and awarded LSI $2.8 million in dam-
ages.' 37 The CAFC granted Sealy their motion for JNOV, finding that
the evidence and argument presented to the jury was inadequate and
did not support a finding of equivalents.
The CAFC in Nestier 13  required that explicit evidence be
presented to the jury showing the equivalents of function, way and
result and that the jury be informed that the patentee is relying on the
doctrine of equivalents for a finding of infringement.' 39 Five years
later, in Lear Seigler,40 the court heightened this requirement by "re-
quir[ing] that the three Graver Tank elements must be presented in the
form of particularized testimony and linking argument."'41 First,
there must be separate testimony showing the accused and the claimed
devices perform substantially the same function, separate testimony
that the two objects perform that function in substantially the same
way, and separate testimony showing that the two objects obtain sub-
134. Id.
135. Nestler, 739 F.2d at 1579.
136. 873 F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
137. Id. at 1423-24.
138. Nestier, 739 F.2d at 1576.
139. In Lear Seigler, argument was advanced that Nestier should be distinguished because
infringement under the doctrine was "disavowed" by the patentee in Nestier, whereas in Lear
Seigler, the patentee clearly relied on the doctrine. Thus Nestier was satisfied because the ex-
plicit testimony of the three Graver Tank elements was an alternative to the clear expression of
reliance on the doctrine of equivalents. The court rejected this argument, saying that the dis-
avowance of the doctrine was dicta in the rationale of the opinion, because the result would have
been the same without it. Lear Seigler, 873 F.2d at 1427.
140. 873 F.2d 1422.
141. Id. at 1426 (emphasis added).
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stantially the same result.142 This is the particularized testimony the
court required.' 43
The second requirement is the linking argument, which connects
the separate testimony together; the court referred to this as "testi-
mony reasonably served to articulate the comparison"I of the equiv-
alence of the two devices. The court required that a party "explicitly
delineate to the jury, through testimony and argument" the equiva-
lence between the two items. 45 Absent this delineation, the jury can-
not find infringement under the doctrine.
The CAFC emphasized, "[a]bsent the proper.., showing of how
plaintiff compares the function, means, and result of its claimed inven-
tion with those of the accused device, a jury is more or less put to sea
without guiding charts when called upon to determine infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents."'" It would be difficult for a jury
to rationally find all three elements absent given specific instructions
regarding identification of the three elements. Accordingly, the court
stated that there is "too much risk the jury will simply compare the
two inventions as to overall similarity, in violation of Graver
Tank."' 47 Because there "was neither argument nor evidence explic-
itly setting forth" the equivalence of result, function, and means, the
court held that the district court should not have instructed the jury on
the doctrine."4  Because the case was "improvidently submitted" to
the jury on the doctrine, the JNOV grant was proper.149
In LSI, a $2.8 million verdict for the patentee was reversed be-
cause of the judge's failure, and likely the patentee's attorney's fail-
ure, to understand this requirement. While there may have actually
been infringement under the doctrine, the evidentiary requirements
were not met; thus there could be no finding of infringement. The LSI
decision may seem to have eliminated any uncertainty in what is re-
quired from an evidentiary standpoint for a finding of infringement
142. See id. at 1425. For a commentary on Lear Seigler explaining what the case required
for evidentiary proof of the doctrine of equivalents, see Wawrzyniak, Proving Patent Infringe-
ment Under the Doctrine of Equivalents: The Specific Evidentiary Requirements for Getting to
the Jury, 55 Mo. L.R. 1105 (1990).
143. Note that this is called "testimony" by the court, implying that only testimonial evi-
dence is adequate to establish the equivalency of function, way and means of the two devices.
See Malta v. Schmulerich Carillons, Inc., 952 F.2d 1320, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (Michel, J.,
concurrence) (implying that this distinction is not dispositive to the case).
144. Lear Seigler, 873 F.2d at 1426.
145. Id. at 1425.
146. Id. at 1425-26.
147. Id. at 1427.
148. I at 1426.
149. Lear Seigler, 873 F.2d at 1426.
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under the doctrine of equivalents. However, in 1991, another JNOV
was granted because the CAFC held that the proper evidence was not
presented.
E. Malta v. Schmulerich Carillons, Inc. Indicates the Recent
Evidentiary Uncertainty in the Doctrine of Equivalents
Infringement Inquiry
Malta v. Schmulerich Carillons, Inc. 5 ' illustrates the CAFC's
uncertainty regarding exactly what is required to find infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents. This 1991 case was decided against
the patentee because of the patentee's failure to present the requisite
evidence to the jury for a finding of infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents. The patentee lost a $950,000 jury verdict on a JNOV
motion, even though both parties in the dispute apparently felt the jury
instruction was an adequate and correct description of the law.151 The
dissent criticized the panel majority on the particular issue of law on
which the JNOV is affirmed by pointing out that "Schulmerich did not
request jury instructions on any of the points on which the panel's
majority opinions now rely."' 52
Both Malta and Schmulerich were manufacturers of hand chimes
for musical performances, and, as is common in infringement suits,
Malta was a former employee of Schmulerich. is3 Malta received a
patent for a hand chime that was easily adjusted "on-the-fly" while
being played to produce different loudness of sound, and sued
Schulmerich for infringement of this patent based on hand chimes that
Schulmerich was manufacturing. 54 The jury found for Malta, but
Schulmerich was granted a JNOV for non-infringement of the patent
under the doctrine of equivalents.15
The patent had two claims at issue," 6 numbers two and three of
the patent, and the jury in an interrogatory found that, while claim
150. 952 F.2d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
151. Id. at 1342 (Newman, L, dissenting) ("The parties agreed on the law to be applied.
There was no objection to the jury instruction:).
152. kL But see infra text accompanying notes 178-79, discussing Schmulerich's defense
in the trial court.
153. Id at 1323. Combined, the two companies supplied about 95% of the handbell market.
Id. at 1323.
154. Id. at 1323.
155. Malta, 952 F.2d at 1323-24.
156. Claims 2 and 3 are the relevant claims. Claim 3 provides:
3. A handbell comprising in combination: a bell having a generally closed end; a
clapper assembly adapted to be removably carried within said bell and centrally of
the closed end thereof, said assembly comprising a clapper shaft having one end
pivotally associated centrally of the closed end of said bell and carrying a clapper
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three had not been literally infringed, it had been infringed under the
doctrine of equivalents. Claim two was not considered for unrelated
reasons. The relevant part of claim three referred to the part of the
clapper of the chime that hits the surface of the bell as having "striking
buttons" with different degrees of hardness."i 7 Adding somewhat to
the confusion, claims two and three both contained reference to a pic-
ture of the claimed device as described by each claim (i.e., two sepa-
rate pictures). The accused device resembled the picture related to
claim two, yet the claim at issue in the appeal was claim three, which
showed a picture different from the accused chime.158
The appellate- court found that the "striking button" language of
claim three, when compared to other claims and the words in the spec-
ification, was a limitation of the claim, making claim three a narrower
claim than, for instance, claim two, which merely used the words
"striking surface."'15 9 To infringe under the doctrine of equivalents,
the accused device must contain that limitation or an equivalent
thereof."6 Because the clapper of the accused device did not use
"buttons" of differing hardness, to vary the loudness, but had three
pairs of "striking surfaces" with differing characteristics, the majority
found that the claim limitation of "buttons" was not met and there
member at its free extremity, said clapper member comprising a generally circular
striker assembly rotatably positioned substantially normal to said clapper shaft
and including a plurality of striking buttons positioned in opposed pairs around
the outer periphery thereof and wherein each pair of buttons has a different de-
gree of hardness; means on said clapper assembly coacting with said rotatable
striker assembly for permitting rotation of said striker assembly relative to said
clapper shaft for selectively positioning desired pairs of buttons in striking rela-
tion to said bell; and detent means cooperating with said rotatable striker for re-
leasably holding said striker assembly in any preselected position.
Id. at 1322.
Claim 2 differed only in that it required an indexing means on the handle and clapper
assembly instead of the coacting means, and instead of "buttons" requires "at least three opposed
pairs of surface portions wherein each of said pairs has a different degree of hardness." Id.
Claim 2 was not at issue in the appeal and it required the addition of an additional element (the
indexing means) which was not present in the accused chime.
157. See supra note 156. Claim two, instead of requiring "buttons" required "at least three
opposed pairs of surface portions." (Emphasis added). Further, in the description of the device
in the specification (prior to the claims), the use of the word "buttons" is again used to refer to
claim three, whereas "striking surfaces" is used in claim two. Malta, 952 F.2d at 1322.
158. See Malta, 952 F.2d at 1322.
159. Id. at 1327.
160. The majority, implying approval of Pennwalt's approach, quotes the rationale in part:
"[there can be no finding of infringement] because the patentee did not establish the presence, in
the accused device, of every claim element 'or its substantial equivalent.' " Id. at 1325. See also
Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (even though
application of the doctrine of equivalents extends the protection of the patent beyond the literal
words of the claims, it is not proper "to erase a plethora of meaningful structural and functional
limitations of the claim on which the public is entitled to rely in avoiding infringement.").
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could not be a finding of infringement. The clapper in the accused
device was made of a single plastic material. The clapper had three
pairs of striking surfaces. To vary the loudness of the chime, one pair
of surfaces had a hole drilled in the clapper material, another pair was
the plastic surface of the clapper with no hole behind it, and the third
surface was the plastic clapper material covered with felt.161 The
claimed "buttons" were of materials of "a different degree of hard-
ness."162 What the court found, then, was that the claim in the patent
actually was "exceeded" because of the narrower claim description of
claim three.'63 Where there is a "broad term in one claim, but a nar-
rower term... in another claim, the implication is that infringement of
the second claim can be avoided by not meeting the narrower
term."'
1
In affirming the JNOV, the court explained that there was insuffi-
cient testimony as to "why the overall function, way, and result of the
accused device are substantially the same as those of the claimed de-
vice and why the plastic/slotted plastic/felt arrangement is the
equivalent of the claimed buttons limitation."' 65 The court indicated
-that the failure of Malta's case was that there was "not sufficiently
particularized evidence"' 6 6 of why the "striking button" limitation of
the claim is the equivalent of the "striking surfaces" of the accused
device. Borrowing from the Lear Seigler, Inc. v. Sealy Mattress167
rationale, without this type of evidence the jury is "put to sea without
guiding charts"'168 and is "left to its own imagination on the technical
issue of equivalency."'169
161. Malta, 952 F.2d at 1326.
162. See claim language, supra note 156.
163. Malta, 952 F.2d at 1327. The court quotes the Perkin-Elmer court's insight into this
issue when it said although the doctrine of equivalents allows protection beyond the words of the
patent, "it is not proper to erase a plethora of meaningful structural and functional limitations of
the claim on which the public is entitled to rely in avoiding infringement." Id. at 1327.
164. IL
165. Id.
166. Id. The concurrence makes this point clear.
For me what is fatal in this record is the failure of Mr. Malta to separate and
explicate his comparative analysis of "way" .... [c]onsequently, there was insub-
stantial evidence of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents as to way ....
... The jury was not separately and explicitly told [that drilling slots in the] same
plastic material is an equivalent "way" compared to attaching striking buttons
made from different materials .... and [while] Mr., Malta may have briefly im-
plied that the way was also essentially the same, the jury certainly was not told
how and why that was so.
Id. at 1328-30.
167. Lear Seigler, 873 F.2d at 1426-27.
168. Malta, 952 F.2d at 1327.
169. L
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The majority required testimony to prove why, considering the
"striking surface" language in claim two (which is the claim not at
issue), and the differing "striking buttons" language, in claim three,
the range of equivalents for claim three should be so expanded to in-
clude a "striking surface" as an equivalent of "striking button." The
argument might be posed: "if patentee had intended to include a strik-
ing surface as part of his claim in claim three, why did he not use the
same language as in claim two?" This is the point in the majority
argument that both the concurrence and the dissent miss.
Judge Newman argued in her dissent that there was "substantial
evidence"' 0 for a reasonable jury to support its finding. She spelled
out specific testimony given by Malta and explained how this is ade-
quate testimony to prove the three elements of the Graver Tank test.
Rather than addressing the limitation issue of the majority, she fo-
cused on the evidence provided as to function, way, result, and specif-
ically considered "way." She argued, "[a]s to way, there was
substantial evidence of how the tone is changed on rotation of the
clapper, due to the change in hardness of the surface in the striking,
for the claimed and accused bell."'' The dissent argued that the ma-
jority has "invoked a new requirement of proof of equivalency: proof
not only of the three Graver Tank 'prongs' of 'function, way, and
result', but also a fourth prong of 'why.' ,172
The concurrence explained this purported misunderstanding by
Judge Newman, but still does not address the majority's concern of
the equivalent of a limitation. 173 Judge Michel's concurring opinion
stated, "[the dissent's] characterization of the majority's holding is in-
accurate. Because often substantial proof of equivalence of 'way' can
be made only by an explanation of 'how and why', the apparently
separate requirement of proof of 'why' is actually only an elaboration
on the requirement of equivalence as to 'way.' " 74 The concurrence
170. Id. at 1333 (Newman, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 1340. The judge makes a similar comment on many occasions in her opinion,
e.g., "There was substantial evidence not only as to this specific claim element but also as to the
invention as a whole, leaving no theory of equivalency uncovered", id. at 1340; "Malta also
presented substantial evidence that the way the striking surfaces produce their various tones is by
varying their degree of hardness.. .", id. at 1340; and, [after discussing the testimony about the
three Graver Tank elements] "[t]he evidence was thorough and, if anything, redundant", id. at
1341.
172. Id. at 1334.
173. The decision is not clear as to whether the concurrence was adding his view to what
the majority stated, but it appears more to address the dissent's concern about what Lear Seigler
requires: "I set forth these concurring views in order to clarify Lear Seigler." Malta, 952 F.2d at
1331. In addition, approximately half of the concurrence is under the heading "III. THE DIS-
SENT." Id. at 1330.
174. Malta, 952 F.2d at 1330.
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never addressed the limitation issue, but focused on the lack of "sub-
stantial ... . separate and explicit" testimony regarding "how and
why" the "way" element of the function/way/result test was substan-
tially similar in the claimed and accused devices. 175
Malta's treatment of the "element-by-element" versus the "as a
whole" approach is not dispositive either way on the issue. As dis-
cussed above, the equivalent limitation issue was the key issue. But
the majority stated that its holding had two bases. Judge Rich ex-
plained that there was insufficient explanation as to both 1) why the
overall function, way, and result of the accused device are substan-
tially the same as those of the claimed device and 2) why the plastic/
slotted plastic/felt arrangement is the equivalent of the claimed buttons
limitation. 176 He never discussed, though, why there was insufficient
evidence regarding the overall function, way, and result test. He fo-
cused his discussion on the equivalence of limitations, the second part
of his two part reason, throughout his doctrine of equivalents analysis.
The first part of his reason can only be considered dicta because
Schmulerich's defense at trial was the issue of equivalent limitations
discussed in the majority opinion. 177 The opinion provides no insight,
discussion, or even case authority for the doctrine of equivalents in-
quiry to be based on "overall" comparison of function/way/result.' 7 1
The court's three different opinions are illuminative of the confu-
sion in the court regarding this enduring issue. Judge Rich's majority
opinion cites the Lear Seigler court's fear that the jury will simply
compare the accused and claimed device as to overall similarity if the
jury is not given particularized testimony. 179 Yet in the next para-
graph, he referred to the overall function/way/result test evidence 8' as
the first issue for which there has not been adequate testimony. While
that statement would seem to be a clear expression of the chosen ap-
proach, the majority performed an element-by-element analysis to up-
hold the lower court's JNOV. By focusing on the two words,
"striking buttons," the opinion viewed a particular element of the
claim. This element of the claim is not even the advancement over the
prior art of the patent; that attribute is described as the ability to
175. See id. at 1328-31.
176. Id. at 1327.
177. See id. at 1323 (discussing the proceedings of the trial court).
178. The majority cites cases, e.g., Pennwalt (element-by-element) and Hughes Aircraft Co.
v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("as a whole"), that have been rationalized as
being both element-by-element cases and "as a whole" cases, but these cases are cited for other
reasons. See the discussion, supra part A., for these opinions with respect to the two different
approaches.
179. Malta, 952 F.2d at 1327.
180. Id.
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change the surfaces while playing the chimes."' The plastic/slotted
plastic/felt surfaces were also known in the prior art." 2
Had the overall function/way/result been applied, the court's
analysis would likely have produced a different result. The overall
function of the invention was to allow the striking surfaces to be
changed while playing the chime; the accused device performed a sub-
stantially similar function. This function was performed by rotating
the clapper during play to change the surface striking the bell; the
accused device worked in substantially the same way and produced
substantially the same result of different loudness of sounds. An "as a
whole" approach would have led to infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents,, but to Malta's chagrin, this approach was not used.
Neither' the dissenting nor the concurring judges could define
which method to use. Judge Newman's dissent expressed ambiva-
lence toward the requisite approach. She explains "[t]here was sub-
stantial evidence not only as to this specific claim element but also as
to the invention as a whole, leaving no theory of equivalency uncov-
ered."' Yet, her opinion follows the majority's element-by-element
approach without criticism. Judge Michel's concurrence only implied
that the "as a whole" approach is the proper consideration. He stated
that a jury verdict can only survive a JNOV motion if substantial evi-
dence is presented "that explicitly and separately compares the func-
tion/way/result of the accused device with the function/way/result of
the claimed invention to show that they are substantially the same." 114
But, like the dissent, he focused his opinion on the quantity and pres-
entation of evidence regarding the equivalence of "way" of the same
plastic striking surface and modifications compared to striking buttons
made of different material, the corresponding elements in the two
devices.18 5
With Malta and Lear Seigler as examples, the court continues to
appear uncertain of the specific evidentiary requirements for a doc-
trine of equivalents infringement finding. In Malta, the CAFC dis-
agrees on the proper approach or test for the doctrine of equivalents,
and gives no indication of the test to be used in the future.
181. Id. at 1337 (Newman, J., dissent) ("It was explained to the jury that what was new in
Malta's bells was his means for rapidly changing the striking surface during a musical
performance.").
182. Id. at 1339 (Newman, J., dissent).
183. Id. at 1340 (Newman, J., dissent).
184. Malta, 952 F.2d at 1329.
185. Id at 1329.
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PART II: SUMMARY OF THE ISSUES FOR A DocnuR OF
EQUrVALENTS ANALYSis
A. The Doctrine Generally
The doctrine of equivalents was developed to avoid a fraud being
performed on the patent, and as such, it made the patent an effective
legal right.'86 The CAFC noted, "[tihe essence of the doctrine of
equivalents is that it permits recovery for infringement where the ac-
cused device does not fall within the literal scope of the claims."' 8 7 If
an accused device can be proven to perform substantially the same
function, in substantially the same way, to obtain substantially the
same result as a claimed device, there is infringement under the doc-
trine of equivalents. From this general statement there inherently fol-
lows certain requirements. The doctrine of infringement is only
reached after there is no literal infringement.' 88 Under the Graver
Tank rationale, the change or substitution in the accused device, which
makes it "different" than the claimed device, must be insubstantial
before equivalency is determined. 189
B. Limitation on the Range of Equivalents
The doctrine is an equitable doctrine, hence, it is not bound by
strict rules for the court to follow. 9 ° Accordingly, with a pioneer pat-
ent, patent claims are generally given a broad range of equivalents,
whereas when the invention is considered an improvement patent, the
range of equivalents allowed is more narrow. 9' Other limitations
have been placed on the range that can be given to equivalents. This
range cannot encompass anything that was in the prior art92 nor can
the patentee extend the scope to cover that which he has given up to
make the claim patentable-prosecution history estoppel.' 93 New
technology created after the issuance of a patent will not necessarily
allow one to escape infringement under the doctrine.' 94
186. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
187. Environmental Instruments, Inc. v. Sutron Corp., 877 F.2d 1561, 1565 (Fed. Cir.
1989).
188. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. 605.
189. Id.
190. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
("The doctrine is judicially devised to do equity").
191. See supra text accompanying notes 115-24.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 91-102.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 103-14.
194. See supra part I.C.
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C. Evidentiary Requirements to Prove Infringement Under the
Doctrine of Equivalents
The CAFC has stated its testimonial and evidentiary require-
ments for a finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.
Infringement and equivalency are questions of fact. 195 Therefore, the
party trying to prove infringement under the doctrine must make it
clear to the jury that they are, in fact, going to try to prove infringe-
ment under the doctrine of equivalents.' 96 They must present to the
jury evidence of separate and explicit testimony showing the substan-
tial similarity of the three Graver Tank elements of function, way, and
result between the accused and claimed devices.' 97 This evidence
must be in the form of particularized testimony to each element of the
claim and a linking argument to connect them together to show the
substantial similarity of the two devices. 198
D. The Element-By-Element Analysis Should be Performed
Although there is arguably no clear holding as to whether the
doctrine of equivalents is applied to the device "as a whole" or ele-
ment-by-element, the element-by-element analysis is the approach the
CAFC should follow. An element-by-element approach is not incor-
rect, yet whether or not it is compelled is unclear.' 99
The CAFC is clear that claim limitations cannot be ignored,200
whether necessary or not.20 ' This requirement, at a minimum, re-
quires a court utilizing a doctrine of equivalents inquiry to perform an
element-by-element inquiry of the claim to discover limitations. Each
element should be considered a limitation because the addition of ele-
ments causes a claim to be more narrow. As more elements are added,
the claimed device encompasses less and less subject matter because
each element pares down what the inventor has legally claimed. Also,
it follows that, as elements are removed from a claim, the claim broad-
ens and encompasses more subject matter. Thus, as elements are ad-
ded or removed, the effect on the claims is to limit or expand them.
Because each element or its equivalent must be present in the
accused device, and each element is considered a limitation, there
must be an element-by-element approach conducted regardless of
195. See, e.g., Malta, 952 F.2d at 1325.
196. See Lear Seigler, 873 F.2d 1422.
197. See, e.g., id.
198. Id.
199. See Pennwalt, 833 F.2d 931.
200. E.g., London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Pennwalt,
833 F.2d 931.
201. See, e.g., Becton Dickinson & Co. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 922 F.2d 792 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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method of analysis. If, in performing a doctrine of equivalents in-
quiry, an element is not found in the accused device, the court next
must search to see if there is an equivalent to the claimed element, or
limitation, in the accused device. If there is no equivalent, there can
be no infringement.
The element-by-element approach should also be followed be-
cause, if an "as a whole" approach is used, then some limitations may
be completely read out of a claim. This holds true where limitations
may be required to be added to a claim in order to gain patentability
over the prior art. Pennwalt exemplifies this concept: where the PTO
examiner required the inventor to add the means for continuously indi-
cating position of the fruit in order to avoid the prior art. The accused
device did not contain this function, and-the court found there was no
infringement. 2" If the Pennwalt court had performed an analysis
looking at the claimed and accused devices as a whole, it is likely that
infringement would have been found. It has been argued that this ap-
proach is no more than a redundant literal infringement inquiry. How-
ever, that argument fails because a literal infringement inquiry is given
no range of equivalents; for literal infringement, the claimed device
must read directly on the accused device." 3
To accept the "as a whole" approach potentially raises an entirely
new issue which would abrogate the efficiency of the approach.
Under an "as a whole" approach, it may be difficult to determine ex-
actly what the "whole" encompasses. As the changes in the accused
device become more minor in the overall view of the device, the jury
must decide whether they can consider the remoteness of the change
in looking at the device overall. Even if differences between the two
devices are recognized, the jury, instructed to look at the device from
a broad perspective, will not know whether or not this can be consid-
ered in its determination. Hence, the jury might look at the device
from an overall point of view, and a minor change, which may be
enough to avoid infringement, would be dismissed as insubstantial.
An element-by-element approach would eliminate -the uncertainty
as to whether a court can consider the "heart" or "gist" of an inven-
tion, thereby avoiding a finding of infringement. 2" By viewing each
element of a claim, and requiring that element or its substantial
equivalent be in" the accused device, whether an element is the "heart"
or "gist" of the invention becomes moot.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 53-60.
203. See Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 934 (Bennett, J., dissenting).
204. See supra text accompanying notes 77-82.
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The CAFC's recognition of the increasing importance of the
"way" part of the function/way/result test for the doctrine of
equivalents °0 favors an element-by-element approach. Judge Ben-
nett, in his dissenting opinion in Pennwalt, discussed the importance
of the "way" inquiry: "the relevant inquiry, as it is in nearly all doc-
trine of equivalents analysis, is whether the accused device and the
claimed invention perform the same overall function to achieve the
same overall result in substantially the same way."2" Generally,
when a device infringes, the "result" and "function" will inherently be
the same.2 ' 7 The device will be designed to perform some particular
task (function) to achieve a particular result (the end result of the pat-
ented device). The most obvious difference is therefore the "way" the
function is performed. Thus, the import of a doctrine of equivalents
inquiry is the "way" part of the analysis. This does not mean that the
"function" and "result" parts of the test can be ignored; only that these
elements generally are not the key points of issue.
An "as a whole" approach may allow both "function" and "re-
sult" to overwhelm the importance of "way." In other words, a jury
performing an "as a whole" analysis may tend to view only the func-
tion and result between the two devices, which tend to be similar, and
abrogate any distinctions in the "way." Because the CAFC has made
it clear that the "way" should not be overlooked, an element-by-ele-
ment approach is favorable.
By following the element-by-element approach, the jury's aware-
ness of the similarities and differences of the two devices enhances the
jury's ability to make a better-informed decision regarding infringe-
ment. Evidence presented to the jury that proves each element of the
claim or its substantial equivalent in the accused device provides a
thorough presentation of the two devices. A lay jury would likely be
inclined to view the two devices as to overall similarity. This is espe-
205. See Malta, 952 F.2d at 1327 ("[W]hile the [accused and claimed devices] are described
as being alternatives to each other, they are not equivalent in 'way.' "); London v. Carson Pide
Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (determining the accused device "does not
work in substantially the same way as the claimed device."); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley
Corp., 939 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding the district court did not err in finding the ac-
cused devices operated in substantially the same manner as the claimed invention.); Spectra
Corp. v. Lutz, 839 F.2d 1579, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (While the "function (dyeing) and the result
(dyed material) are broadly the same .... [tihe ways in which that function are performed and the
result is obtained ... are entirely distinct").
206. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 940-41 n.3 (Bennett, J., dissenting). One commentator has
noted, "In most cases, the issue is almost invariably whether the accused device performs the
overall function in substantially the same way as the claimed invention." Adelman & Francione,
supra note 10, at 687-88.
207. This would be an infringer's purpose-to get the same "result" If it were not the
same "function", infringement likely would not be an issue.
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cially true with more complex devices, where the distinctions may be
difficult to understand or even "blur" in the juror's mind throughout
lengthy expert testimony and trial. Hence, even if the jury were only
slightly inclined to view the two objects overall, the presentation of
evidence required by the element-by-element approach will allow
them to see the two devices from the perspective of their relative com-
plexity. This is especially important in cases in which a patent seems
to be simple but is in fact quite complex, like the dimple pattern on a
golf ball. This presentation also provides the jury with an understand-
ing of any limitations on the claimed device, which must be consid-
ered when performing a doctrine of equivalents analysis, regardless of
approach.
Admittedly, an advantage of the "as a whole" approach is its evi-
dentiary simplicity. Relative to the element-by-element approach,
which requires presentation of evidence for similarity of each and
every element of the claimed device, the "as a whole" approach re-
quires only evidence as to overall function/way/result between the
claimed and accused devices. But this distinction is not enough to
compel the use of the "as a whole" approach. The burden of an evi-
dentiary showing should not be enough to encourage the court to se-
lect an approach that may result in findings of infringement, where a
more detailed look at the evidence would have revealed important dis-
tinctions that would lead to a finding of no infringement. In light of
the realization of the court that the focus of a doctrine of equivalents
analysis is in equivalence of "way," the court could require that only
the "way" of the two devices should be presented in evidence in the
detail required by "particularized testimony and linking argument'" for
each and every element.2 °0 Additionally, the trial court could seek
stipulation by the parties as to equivalence of function and result, re-
ducing the evidentiary requirements at trial.
As a practical matter, if the CAFC does not clarify this issue, the
element-by-element approach should be followed by the patentee
when presenting her case to the jury. A presentation of evidence that
follows the element-by-element approach necessarily includes evi-
dence that would be required for an "as a whole" approach. Accord-
ingly, the proposed jury instruction will follow the element-by-
element approach.
208. See Wawrzyniak, supra note 142.
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E. Doctrine of Equivalents as Applied to a 35 U.S.C. section
112-6 "Means-Plus-Function" Claim Elementf° 9
Generally patent claims describe structure, not function. t For
example, a claim may read: "A resistor that comprises 1) a ceramic
core; 2) a coating of carbon on the core; and 3) a stripe of conductive
material at each end of the core in electrical contact with the carbon
coating." All these descriptions are of structure of the claim, not how
it operates, or functions. But Congress determined certain claims
would be more efficiently described as a function 35 U.S.C. section
112, paragraph 6, provides, in part, an "element in a claim for a com-
bination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a speci-
fied function." This is referred to as "means for" or "means plus
function" language. A claim of this nature might read: "A resistor that
comprises: 1) a ceramic core; 2) a coating of carbon on the core; and
3) means at each end of the core for controlling the flow of electrons
across the carbon surface at each end of the core."
An issue that will confront a jury when determining infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents is how to analyze an equivalent of a
"means-plus-function" claim. Section 112-6 states that a claim with
such an element "shall be construed to cover the corresponding struc-
ture, materials, or acts described in the specification and equivalents
thereof."211 The "equivalents" under a section 112-6 inquiry and
"equivalents" under the doctrine of equivalents are different.212 In-
fringement under section 112-6 is literal infringement.213 Under the
literal infringement of section 112-6, the issue is whether the "means
in the accused device is structurally equivalent to the means described
in the specification."2"4 This is not the complete inquiry as to literal
infringement, because the element in the accused device and the ele-
209. For a more thorough discussion of the background and purpose of 35 U.S.C. § 112,
paragraph 6, see 4 CmsuM, supra note 71, § 8.04[2].
210. See, e.g., United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228 (1942) (a patentee
may not broaden his claims by describing the product in terms of function). See supra note 58.
211. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (emphasis added).
212. See D.M.L, Inc. v. Deere & Co., 755 F.2d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Pennwalt Corp.
v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en bane), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
961 (1988). Cf. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Renishaw PLC, 740 F. Supp. 1038, 1045, (S.D.N.Y.
1990), rev'd in part, vacated in part, 945 F.2d 1173 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("One oddity of patent law
is that literal infringement can be on a type of equivalence, which is held to be different from the
'doctrine of equivalents.' ").
213. See Data Line Corp. v. Micro Technologies, Inc., 813 F.2d 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(noting under § 112-6 "infringement is said to be 'literal' as distinguished from infringement
under the doctrine of equivaence."); Sun Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equip. Leasing, Inc., 872 F.2d 978
(Fed. Cir. 1989), modified, 872 F.2d 978 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
214. Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc., 939 F.2d 1533, 1536 (Fed. Ci. 1991); accord Symbol
Technologies, Inc. v. Opticon, Inc., 935 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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ment in the claimed device must also perform exactly the same func-
tion; if they do not, section 112-6 equivalency is not involved.215 "If,
as a threshold matter, the recited functions are not performed by the
accused device, there can be no literal infringement." '216
In a section 112-6 analysis, the court must compare the means
that are described in the specification of the claimed device with the
means for performing the function in the accused device. If the means
in the accused device are the same as in the specification, or
equivalent to those in the specification, and it is performing the same
function, this element "reads on" the claimed element in a literal in-
fringement analysis. The equivalents of a section 112-6 inquiry are
more limited than the doctrine of equivalents "equivalents" inquiry.2 17
The scope of section 112-6 equivalents is confined to the structures
expressly disclosed in the specifications and corresponding
equivalents.2" 8 Thus, if the wording of section 112-6 limiting the
means to those described in the specification or the equivalent thereof
did not exist, an element of a claim when described as a "means for"
performing a function would, if read literally, encompass any and all
means for performing the function.
As an example, if the specification for the resistor described
above stated that the means for controlling the flow of electrons across
the carbon core consisted of an aluminum based metal, a similar de-
vice that used a sodium based metal would not infringe. But any alu-
minum based metal, not just one with a specific quantity of aluminum,
would infringe. Without the limitation described in the specification,
the sodium based metal device, or any device that controlled the flow
of electrons across a carbon core, would also infringe. Section 112-6
operates to cut back on the means literally encompassed by the claim,
but it "has no effect on the function specified-it does not extend the
element [of the claim] to equivalent functions." '219 Thus, with the re-
sistor example, if an accused device had a function for the third ele-
215. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 934.
216. Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr v. Schubert & Salzer Maschinenfabrik AG, 829 F.2d
1075, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (emphasis added).
217. Sun Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equip. Leasing, Inc., 872 F.2d 978 (Fed. Cir. 1989), modified,
872 F.2d 978 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
218. Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Opticon, Inc., 935 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Accord
Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc., 939 F.2d 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Naturally, one author has
indicated, "But it would not take two minutes for any patent lawyer to come up with examples of
the question, 'What is or is not equivalent to a particular disclosed device?'" Tom Arnold,
Recent Developments in Patent Law, in PRocEED Nos OF THE TwmrrY-Smr ANNuMA INsrrrum
oN PATENr LAw 1-32, (Carol Holgren ed., 1989).
219. Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 885 F.2d 1574, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (emphasis added).
Accord Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 934.
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mentof changing the flow of electrons only when there was a certain
specified quantity of electrons flowing across the carbon surface, a
literal infringement claim under section 112-6 would fail even if the
function was found to be equivalent.
Contrast this with a doctrine of equivalents analysis. Under the
doctrine of equivalents, the range of equivalent means are not limited
by the specification.220 Furthermore, it must be decided whether the
accused device performs substantially the same function in substan-
tially the same way to achieve substantially the same result.221 The
section 112-6 inquiry does not involve the tripartite test. In addition,
when determining "equivalents" in a doctrine of equivalents inquiry,
other factors such as the prior art and the prosecution history must be
considered;222 these play no part in a section 112-6 equivalents
inquiry.
The issue arises, then, as how to analyze a "means-plus-function"
claim when the doctrine of equivalents is being used to determine in-
fringement. The key to a doctrine of equivalents inquiry where a
claim has "means-plus-function" language is to look to the "function"
performed.22 Recall that when looking at a "means-plus" element in
a claim during a literal infringement inquiry, the function performed
must be exactly the same in the accused and claimed device.2"
Therefore, section 112-6 claim language can be considered under the
doctrine of equivalence only if the accused device is found to have a
substantially similar function that is performed in substantially the
same way to achieve substantially the same result as the claimed de-
vice. If there is no substantially similar function, there is no
infringement.
Next, when determining substantially the same "way" when no
explicit "way," or means, is specified, as in a "means-plus" claim, the
court can only look to those means described in the specification and
their equivalents. This is the same as in a literal infringement inquiry
where the claims use "means-plus" language. It is the standard sec-
tion 112-6 inquiry. Once these means are ascertained, the court must
look to the same factors viewed to determine the range of equivalents
220. See supra part LB.
221. D.M.I., Inc. v. Deere & Co., 755 F.2d 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
222. See supra part I.B.
223. This is implied in Pennwalt's majority opinion. The majority indicated that the district
court did not err by looking to the specifications to determine if a § 112-6 means-for element had
an equivalent in the accused device, and the court continued, "but it is readily apparent that the
[district] court did not limit its infringement analysis. The court also looked for equivalentfunc-
tions." Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 936.
224. See supra text accompanying note 216. Literal infringement requires the claimed sub-
ject matter to "read on" the accused subject matter. See supra text accompanying notes 30-31.
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for a non-"means-for" claim,' and determine the range of
equivalents for the "means-for" claim. This may result in a larger
range of equivalents when "means plus" language is used because of
the different possibilities of "means." For each "means," or its
equivalent, in the specifications, there will be a corresponding range
of "equivalents" when applying the "substantially the same way" lan-
guage of a doctrine of equivalents analysis.
Thus, in the resistor example, under a doctrine of equivalents
analysis, a sodium based metal tised as the third element may be a
substantially similar means of controlling the electron flow, if it is
determined that aluminum and sodium based "controls" are substan-
tially similar. Thus, a device using this technique may infringe under
the doctrine of equivalents.
When a claim is phrased in "means-plus" language in accordance
with section 112-6 and the doctrine of equivalents is used for infringe-
ment, the analysis still requires determination of the equivalents of
"way" of. the function/way/result test. But the equivalents, for the
"way" part of the test, are for the equivalents of the means "described
in the specification [or the means'] equivalents thereof."22 6
PART II: PROPOSAL OF STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTION
A. Purpose of a Standard Jury Instruction
A standard jury instruction would provide courts, attorneys, pat-
entees, and competitors with a clearer understanding of what the law
requires regarding infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. In
addition, it would provide a list of issues that the jury must consider
and also dictate what testimony and evidence which would need to be
presented. The use of a standard instruction would minimize confu-
sion and conflicts, and tend to reduce the number of appeals227 to the
CAFC in patent issues. The CAFC has indicated that there is a gen-
eral desire to minimize these items in the federal judicial System.2 8
The development and acceptance of a standard instruction would re-
duce erroneous jury decisions, such as those in Malta229 and Lear
Seigler.230
225. These factors include the prior art, the prosecution history, the other claims, pioneer vs.
non-pioneer and are discussed in this comment. See S.R.I. Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775
F.2d 1107 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
226. 35 U.S.C. § 112-6.
227. Biodex Corp. v. Loredan Biomedical, Inc., 946 F.2d 850 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
228. Id.
229. Malta v. Schmulerich Carillons, Inc., 952 F.2d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
230. Lear Seigler, 873 F.2d 1422.
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B. Issues Presented in a Doctrine of Equivalents Instruction
This comment has covered the issues in a jury instruction. The
courts have held that questions of equivalency and infringement are
questions of fact, to be decided by the jury.231 Claim interpretation is
a question of law, to be decided by the court.232 But the CAFC has
indicated that interpreting claims sometimes requires the resolution of
factual issues. In C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems,
Inc., 3 the CAFC explained, "[c]laim interpretation may depend upon
conflicting evidentiary material which can give rise to a genuine fac-
tual dispute. Resolution of any such factual dispute is required for
proper claim interpretation."'"2 4 Hence, a factual dispute must be re-
solved by the jury before the court can interpret the claims. If the
court interprets the claims as encompassing the accused devise, then
the jury can decide whether equivalency and infringement exist.
Although the CAFC has determined that the claim interpretation
is a question of law, the jury must also interpret claims when deter-
mining if there is equivalency. The court cannot be expected to put
into words its interpretation of how broad the scope is for equivalency.
The court can only decide if the claims may be interpreted to cover the
accused device and thus submit the issue to the jury. Then the jury
has the task of determining if the evidence presented regarding the
prosecution history, prior art, the other claims, etc., allows the claim to
be extended to cover the accused product; in other words, the jury
determines the range of equivalency. Then, after equivalency is de-
cided, the jury determines infringement. It is not possible for the jury
to consider equivalency without knowing or interpreting the scope of
the claims. For this reason, the factors regarding the scope of the
claims have been included in the proposed jury instruction.
C. Amenability of a Standard Instruction
A standard instruction is possible. It must be "both legally cor-
rect and sufficiently comprehensive to address factual issues for which
there is disputed evidence of record."'"2 5 This comment has reviewed
the issues of the doctrine of equivalents. Some of these issues have
231. See, e.g., Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609 ("A finding of equivalence is a determination
of fact."); Malta, 952 F.2d at 1325 ("The issues of infringement and of equivalency are issues of
fact."); Oadey, Inc. v. Int'l Tropic-Cal, Inc., 923 F.2d 167, 169 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("Infringement
is a question of fact.").
232. See, e.g., Key Mfg. Group, Inc. v. Microdot, Inc., 925 F.2d 1444, 1448 (Fed. Cir.
1991) ("Claim interpretation is a question of law.").
233. 911 F.2d 670 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
234. Id. at 673.
235. Biodex Corp. v. Loredan Biomedical, Inc., 946 F.2d 850, 854 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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been resolved by the CAFC, while others have been clouded by uncer-
tainty. For the important and unsettled issue of the "element-by-ele-
ment" versus the "as a whole" approach, the proposed instruction
presents an "element-by-element" approach.1 6 Should the CAFC
have the desire and opportunity to issue an opinion contrary to this
approach, the instruction will obviously need to be rewritten. Due to
the conflicting results on the issue, a standard jury instruction needs to
be established. Although the CAFC may, given the opportunity, re-
solve the issue, further delay in delineating a standard will only exac-
erbate the conflict.
In composing this instruction, the instruction given in Malta,"
which both parties and the court felt were adequate, was viewed as a
starting point. The issues discussed in this comment were added in
accordance with the law as it has been interpreted and created23 by
the CAFC. It has been said that the doctrine is an equitable one and
equivalence is not the prisoner of formula.239 As such, special expla-
nations that may be appropriate embellish the instruction to emphasize
an issue and thus reflect change in the law by producing a different
instruction.
The proposed instruction contains terms of art that have been de-
fined throughout this comment. These terms are not defined in the
instruction itself. First, the jury should at a minimum be familiar with
these terms by the end of the trial. Secondly, this instruction is only
relevant to resolve the doctrine of equivalents issue. Presumably,
there will be instructions on other issues, such as literal infringement.
As a foundation to all these instructions, definitions of all the terms of
art should be given by the court. These definitions are important, but
they are collateral to the issue of this comment and are not formulated
herein.
D. Proposed Jury Instruction for Doctrine of Equivalents
Infringement
The following is the proposed jury instruction. Its syntax is as if
it were being read to the jury by the judge:
Infringement under the doctrine of equivalents may exist if the
accused device performs substantially the same function in substan-
tially the same way to achieve substantially the same result as the
236. See supra part ll.D.
237. Malta, 952 F.2d at 1342 (dissent).
238. See Graver Tank, 339 U.S. 605. There is no mention of the doctrine of equivalence in
35 U.S.C. §§ 1-367.
239. See Graver Tank, 339 U.S. 605.
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claimed device. When determining this, you must consider each
and every element in the claim. Each element is a limitation, caus-
ing the claim to cover less subject matter, and is not in the claim
inadvertently. If an element in the claim is not present in the ac-
cused device, you must determine if there is an equivalent of the
function that the element performs in the accused device. If there is
no equivalent of the element, there is no infringement.
What constitutes equivalency must be determined considering
the prosecution history, the prior art and whether the patent is a
pioneer or improvement patent. The scope of equivalency cannot
encompass what was abandoned or surrendered during prosecution
of the patent. The scope also cannot extend so far as to cover sub-
ject matter that is in the prior art, or knowledge that was already
available to the public in any form. The smaller the advance over
the prior art the more narrow the range of equivalents.
The claims describe the patent. Equivalents must be estab-
lished with respect to the claims of the patent, not for the commer-
cial purposes for which the claimed or accused products are used,
or what the inventor describes in the specification.
If the accused device uses technology or a product that has
been developed after the issuance of the patent, this does not mean
that the accused device cannot necessarily infringe. You still must
determine whether the new technology in the accused device per-
forms substantially the same function in substantially the same way
to achieve substantially the same result as the claimed device.
To find infringement, you must have been provided explicit
evidence that particularly points out each element in the accused
device and claimed device and been explicitly told how and why
each element in the accused device performs substantially the same
function in substantially the same way to achieve substantially the
same result as each element in the claimed device. There must
have been evidence presented to you showing an explicit compari-
son between the two devices in terms of function, way, and result
of the elements in each. If this was not presented to you, you can-
not find infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.
If section 112-6 language is used in the claim at issue, the follow-
ing paragraphs should be added to the instruction, immediately fol-
lowing the first paragraph of the instruction. Again, it is emphasized
that a different instruction must also be presented describing the sec-
tion 112-6 "means-plus-function" type of claim, as well as the rele-
vant terms of art, but it is not included here as it is beyond the scope of
this comment.
The claim at issue uses "means plus function" language. To
find infringement of this claim under the doctrine of equivalents
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requires a two step analysis. You must first determine the "means"
that are claimed in the patent. These are described only by the
claim language, the means described in the specification, and
equivalents to the means described in the specification. These
equivalents are not related to equivalents under the doctrine of
equivalents. The accused device must have the same-means, or you
cannot find infringement of the "means plus function" language.
Recall, for this determination, the "means" are the same as the
"way" of the function/way/result test.
Second, and only after completion of the first step, you must
determine, from all of-the possible means established from the first
step, if the accused device performs substantially the same func-
tion, in substantially the same way, to achieve substantially the
same result as the claimed device. When determining whether the
two devices perform in substantially the same way, you must con-
sider the range of equivalents to all the means which the patentee
has claimed in [his] [her] patent.

